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Symposium: The Canon(s) of Constitutional Law

THE CANON(S) OF CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW: AN INTRODUCTION
Mark Tushnet*
Any discipline has a canon, a set of themes that organize the
way in which people think about the discipline. Or, perhaps, any
discipline has a number of competing canons. Is there a canon
of constitutionallaw? 1 A group of casebook authors met in December 1999 to discuss the choices they had made-what they
had decided to include, what to exclude, what they regretted excluding (or including), what principles they used in developing
their casebooks. 2 Most of the authors were affiliated with law
schools, but some had developed coursebooks for use in undergraduate political science and constitutional history courses.
Each participant was asked to write a short paper describing the
canon of constitutional law, either as reflected in his or her
choices, or in the range of materials available in the field. 3

* Carmack Waterhouse Professor of Constitutional Law, Georgetown University
Law Center. I would like to thank the participants in the Georgetown Discussion Group
on Constitutional Law, some of whose written contributions are included here, and all of
whose contributions to the discussion are reflected in my introduction. I would also like
to thank Dean Judith Areen for the support she has given the Discussion Group over the
past decade.
1. For a theoretical discussion, see J.M. Balkin and Sanford Levinson, The Canons
of Constitutional lAw, 111 Harv. L. Rev. 963 (1998).
2. I invited the authors of every casebook on my shelf and authors of as many
other coursebooks as I became aware of. I also invited a number of political scientists
and law professors who had not written coursebooks but were coursebook users.
3. The papers were to be ten to fifteen pages long. As you will see, some authors
took the page limitation more seriously than others. Some of the participants used papers that had been published elsewhere, which was not a violation of the rules of participation, but was a reason for excluding the papers from this collection. See, e.g., Derrick
Bell, Constitutional Conflicts: The Perils and Rewards of Pioneering in the lAw S,chool
Classroom, 21 Seattle U. L. Rev. 1039 (1998).
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What do coursebook authors' reflections on their choices
show about the canon(s) of constitutional law? In my view,
three themes pervaded our discussions, and many of the papers
that follow. A crude classification is that one theme involves the
focus of the constitutional law canon, another involves the
canon's substance, and the third involves the audience for constitutional law studies. 4
Participants expressed substantial interest in teaching something about the Constitution in non-judicial settings. This interest
takes several forms. In what seems initially to be the narrowest
form, the interest lies in ensuring that students know what happens next. That is, what happens after the Supreme Court decides a constitutional question? Students ought to know, many
participants thought, that Congress enacted a statute requiring
the armed forces to allow service members to wear "item[s] of
religious apparel" if doing so would not "interfere with the performance of the member's military duties," after the Court held
that the Constitution did not require such an accommodation. 5
Perhaps more interesting are legislative reactions to decisions
finding a statute unconstitutional. After United States v. Lopez,6
for example, Congress re-enacted the Gun Free School Zones
Act, this time including findings and a jurisdictional element
making it an offense to possess (near a school) a gun that had
moved in interstate commerce.7 Instructors could use this statute to probe the meaning of Lopez: How important is Lopez as
a case about fundamental principles of federalism if its strictures
can be overcome by a statute containing findings and a jurisdictional element?

4. A recent thread in the Conlaw discussion list moderated by Eugene Volokh
suggests that concern about the audience affects the way in which law professors construct syllabi for their courses and the preferences they have for teaching constitutional
law in the first or second years of law school. Obviously, those who teach constitutional
law or history to undergraduates have other concerns, but, as I suggest below, the fact
that their audience is undergraduates brings their approach close to one supported to
some extent by those who teach constitutional law in law schools.
5. See Geoffrey R. Stone, et al., Constitutional Law 1515-17 (Little, Brown & Co.,
2d ed. 1991). The reference to the statute is omitted from the third edition. See Geoffrey R. Stone, et al., Constitutional Law 1596-97 (Little, Brown & Co., 3d ed. 1996). I
mention this to note the pervasive concern among casebook authors for creating a book
of manageable length (and the judgment, shared by its co-authors, that the third edition
of the cited work presses the limits of manageability).
6. 514 u.s. 549 (1995).
7. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(1)(1994) (findings); id. § 922(q)(2)(defining the offense
with a jurisdictional element).
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A broader discussion might be introduced if students knew
that legislative vetoes versist after Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha. Here instructors might ask why legislative vetoes persist and thereby open a discussion of the way in
which political forces might exert a hydraulic effect on legislation, by which I mean that political forces will seek their own
level no matter what the Supreme Court says the Constitution
allows. This discussion, in turn, might be linked to others, such
as one way of presenting the legislative response to the Court's
desegregation decisions. Here at least two paths seem open.
Along one, the class could explore Gerald Rosenberg's argument about the conditions for successful judicial intervention,
based on the Constitution, in controversial public policy questions.9 Along another, it might use these discussions to examine
Barry Friedman's account of constitutional adjudication as a
process of dialogue between the Supreme Court and Congress. 10
The Constitution plays another role in non-judicial settings:
Non-judicial actors sometimes discuss the Constitution in the ordinary course of their business. Sometimes, as in the case of impeachment, they do so because no one else has authority to do
so. Sometimes they do so because they believe they have a constitutional duty to consider the constitutionality of legislative
proposals. 11 Many participants believed that students would
profit from some examination of constitutional interpretation as
practiced by non-judicial actors and noted the general scarcity of
materials available to support such an examination. 12
I believe that such discussions, when supported with appropriate materials, would be provocative along several dimensions.

8. See Louis Fisher and Neal Devins, Political Dynamics of Constitutional Law
125-28 (West, 2d ed. 1996).
9. See generally Gerald N. Rosenberg, The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring About
Social Change? 30-36 (U. of Chicago Press, 1991).
10. See generally Barry Friedman, Dialogue and Judicial Review, 91 Mich. L. Rev.
577, 653·71 (1993).
11. Larry Alexander and Frederick Schauer, On Extrajudicial Constitutional Inter·
pretation, 110 Harv. L. Rev. 1359 (1997), bite the bullet and conclude that the argument
for judicial supremacy in constitutional interpretation is an argument for judicial exclusivity and that non-judicial actors should not consider the constitutionality of legislative
proposals. I think it fair to say that most scholars, even those who support judicial supremacy, reject the conclusion Alexander and Schauer draw (although my view is that
their inference is correct given the premise of judicial supremacy, which is a reason for
rejecting the premise).
12. But see Fisher and Devins, Political Dynamics of Constitutional Law at 1 (cited
in note 8); Paul Brest and Sanford Levinson, Processes of Constitutional Decisionmaking:
Cases and Materials 903-1015 (Little, Brown and Co., 2d ed. 1983).
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How different are legislative or executive discussions of constitutionality from judicial ones, for example? Constitutional scholars generally believe that judges draw on a repertoire of interpretive approaches in justifying their constitutional conclusions, 13
and (perhaps) that these approaches are organized in a rough hierarchy, with precedent and original understanding having presumptive priority over other approaches. Do legislators and executive officials use the same interpretive repertoire, and if so,
do they act as if they accepted the same hierarchy that courts
do?
I am confident that sustained inquiry would reveal that legislative and executive officials are more conscious of, and invoke
somewhat more systematically, obviously political considerations-that is, concerns about how taking one or another constitutional position would affect their political prospects. 14 If I am
right, the examination would also allow us to discuss the purported differences between judges and other officials more subtly than usually occurs. For, after all, what is perjoratively political from one point of view is sensibly prudential from another.
And prudentialism is part of the judicial repertoire of interpretive approaches. 15 But if legislators are (politically) pragmatic
and judges are Gudicially) pragmatic, the case for a judicial
power to displace legislative decisions is weakened. 16
Participants also recurrently identified important matters of
constitutional governance that are not the subject of decided
cases, some of which, they thought, should be brought into the
constitutional law course. The political question doctrine bars
the courts from considering some of these topics, such as impeachment. As recent events showed, interpretive questions of
some significance can arise in connection with these topics. Perhaps more interesting, though, are constitutional questions that
are, as Vicki C. Jackson put it, "invisible" because they are

13. See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A Constructivist Coherence Theory of Constitutional Interpretation, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 1189 (1987); Philip Bobbitt, Constitutional Fate
(Oxford U. Press, 1982).
14. Their political prospects are, I believe, themselves affected (though not determined) by whether the position the politicians take expresses good public policy.
15. See, e.g., John H. Garvey and T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Modern Constitutional
Theory: A Reader 193-212 (West, 4th ed. 1999) (presenting sections on pragmatism and
minimalism ).
16. Particularly if one can also establish that legislators give prudential judgments a
higher place in the hierarchy of interpretation than judges do, and that the legislators'
interpretive hierarchy is more defensible than the judges'.
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taken-for-granted aspects of our system. 17 It is an important aspect of U.S. constitutionalism that we have had elections held at
the regularly scheduled times throughout our history, even in the
18
midst of civil war and large-scale international conflicts. Perhaps relatedly, U.S. civilian officials have been able to maintain
control over the military, a phenomenon that is not universal
among constitutional states.
These are clearly important elements in U.S. constitutionalism. How can they be brought into a course on constitutional
law? One possibility is to use them (or one or two of them) to
raise questions about the meaning of law in our courses. Should
a convention against military intervention in politics be treated
in the same way that the Incompatibility Clause is? 19 This is a
point at which some reference to comparative constitutional law
might be useful as well. Constitutional conventions are a much
more prominent feature of constitutional thinking outside the
United States than they are here. The constitution of the United
Kingdom consists solely of conventions.w The Canadian Supreme Court has issued substantial opinions dealing with the
content of constitutional conventions governing the relation between Canada's provinces and the nation. 21 Many teachers of
17. Professor Jackson's paper is not included in this collection because she plans to
develop its arguments at even more substantial length elsewhere.
18. Although the existence of a war, and the prospect of direct U.S. involvement,
did induce Franklin D. Roosevelt to run for a third term in 1940, contrary to what
seemed to be a convention against third terms.
19. The Incompatibility Gause, U.S. Const., Art. I, § 6, cl. 2, provides, "no Person
holding any Office under the United States, shall be a Member of either House during
his Continuance in Office." It is, I believe, the constitutional text most closely related to
the question of civilian control of the military. Article II of course makes the president
the commander in chief of the armed forces but does not preclude the possibility that the
president would himself or herself be a military officer. See generally U.S. Const., Art.
II, § 2, c!. 2.

20. As a matter of stated law, the British parliament could displace any existing
constitutional convention, including conventions about holding parliamentary elections.
The political limits on doing so are quite substantial. Notably, as a matter of stated law,
any existing provision in the U.S. Constitution can be displaced by a constitutional
amendment. See generally U.S. Const., Art. V. The formal barriers to such amendments
may be no more substantial than the political barriers to changes in fundamental conventions in the British constitution. (1be provision barring amendments to the equal representation of states in the Senate arguably could be changed by successive amendmentsone amending that portion of Article V, and the next one altering the states' representation in the Senate. My own view is that this could be accomplished in a single step, although most of those who commented on this suggestion on the Conlaw discussion list
appear to believe that such an amendment would have to be adopted unanimously rather
than by the lesser supermajorities required by Article V.)
21. See, e.g., Reference re Secession of Quebec, (1998] 2 Can. S.C.R. 217; Reference re Resolution to Amend the Constitution, (1981] 1 Can. S.C.R. 753 (Patriation
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constitutional law present their students with variants of the
question, "What is the law in constitutional law," intending to
help students think about the difference (if any) between constitutional law and good public policy. Questions about the legal
status of constitutional conventions might raise the same point
from a slightly different direction.
An important substantive theme in the participants' discussions, reflected in the papers that follow, was the importance of
membership questions for constitutional law. Taken narrowly,
membership questions deal with such matters as the position of
U.S. citizens when they travel from one state to another,22 the
status of Puerto Rico in the U.S. constitutional system, and the
constitutional rights of long-term resident aliens lawfully present
in the United States. 23
These narrow questions open much broader issues, however. Consider, for example, the role that natural rights (or
"fundamental rights") theorizing plays in constitutional adjudication. When one looks to the non-constitutional- that is,
philosophical-literature on natural rights, one discovers that it
centers on the rights of human beings as such. On the first level
of the philosophical discussions, the membership questions deal
with who (or what) counts as a person entitled to the natural
rights the philosophers identify. 24
There is, however, a second level, in which questions of nationality are raised. Nearly everyone seems to agree that people
are entitled to give greater weight to the interests of their family
members than to the interests of unrelated people located a long
distance away. As we move out from the family, though, the
consensus dissipates: families, surely, friends and neighbors,
probably, but what about people who are merely co-residents of
a territorially defined nation-state? To put the point provocaReference).
22. For the Supreme Court's most recent discussion, see Saenz v. Roe, 119 S. 0.
1518 (1999). See also Laurence H. Tribe, Saenz Sans Prophecy: Does the Privileges Or
Immunities Revival Portend the Future-Or Reveal the Structure of the Present?, 113
Harv. L. Rev. 110 (1999).
23. I believe that interest in membership questions is a natural extension of the effects that identity politics had on constitutional law in the past decade. The issues of
identity politics that shaped discussion of the regulation of hate speech and sexually explicit materials raised basic questions about claims for the universal applicability of constitutional principles as they had conventionally been understood theretofore. Issues
regarding membership raise similar questions.
24. So, for example, the literature discusses whether fetuses, infants, those in persistent vegetative states, or animals have rights that must be honored.
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tively: Cosmopolitan intellectuals located on the east and west
coasts of the United States have more in common with their
peers in Europe and Japan than they do with many residents of
Montana and Idaho. Why should a Constitution structured to
some extent around natural rights make the simple fact of coresidence in the United States more important than interests
shared in common across national boundaries? 25
Cosmopolitanism raises another set of membership questions. Here the concern is with U.S. membership in the community of nations. Some participants argued that the canon of constitutional law should expand to include more materials about
international law, understood broadly. Existing casebooks do
deal with some aspects of the U.S. constitutional law of foreign
relations, particularly with the relations between nation and
state, and between president and Congress, in making foreign
policy. The suggestion is, however, that students should be exposed to materials dealing with the implications (if any) of international law for U.S. constitutional law.
One can offer a fairly narrow pragmatic justification for attention to international law: Ignoring it may muck up U.S. nonconstitutional policy. The best current examples are the complications introduced into the administration of capital punishment
by the complex questions of how U.S. commitments to international law affect state administration of the death penalty. Many
nations will refuse to extradite fugitives who face the death penalty (or who face long stays on death row before they are executed), on the ground that U.S. practices are inconsistent with
international human rights law. 26
Of course, there are larger questions. I have already mentioned that cosmopolitanism raises important issues in political
theory. And, I believe, constitutional law in the next decade is
likely to grapple with the implications of globalization for the
domestic political regime, a regime that I have argued has constitutional status.27 I might be wrong, but at least for the next couple of years there is reason to take up the implications of inter25. I have raised similar questions (ignored in the constitutional literature and perhaps correctly so) about John Hart Ely's representation-reinforcement account of constitutional interpretation. See Mark Tushnet, Red, White, and Blue: A Critical Analysis of
Constitutional Law 87 n.35 (Harvard U. Press, 1988).
26. See generally Knight v. Florida, 120 S. a. 459, 462-64 (1999) (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). Cf. Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371 (1998).
27. Mark Tushnet, The Supreme Court: 1998 Term-Foreword: The New Constitutional Order and the Chastening of Constitutional Aspiration, 113 Harv. L. Rev. 26 (1999).
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national developments, and, therefore, the implications of international law, for U.S. constitutional law.
Finally, participants were concerned about the audience for
constitutional law courses. Some participants believed that they
were primarily to be concerned about educating lawyers who
must know the fundamentals of constitutional law if they are to
be minimally competent professionals. Others believed that
they were primarily to be concerned about educating people
who, because of their professional credentials, were likely to be
influential citizens in their communities. The disagreement, in
short, is between educating professionals and educating responsible citizens.
The choice one makes affects a large number of pedagogical
decisions, including decisions about the selection of materials.
At this point it seems worth returning to a point I noted earlier:
The canon is constructed in part by processes of inclusion and
exclusion, and the latter incorporate questions about what the
market will tolerate. 28 So far I have discussed things that participants believe ought to included in any decent constitutional law
course. But for every inclusion comes (almost) another exclusion.
The current canon of constitutional law excludes materials
that were prominent in earlier canons. Most constitutional law
coursebooks aimed at law students contain very little about constitutional criminal procedure, a topic that was extruded a generation ago into specialized courses. 29 There is today almost no
discussion of intergovernmental tax immunities in any casebook,
and precious little about limitations on the ability of states to tax
interstate commerce. It is not clear, however, what large topic
now included in standard constitutional law coursebooks could
30
readily be omitted.

28. On the crudest, but not insignificant, level, the question is how heavy a book we
can reasonably expect our students to lug around.
29. Participants who teach undergraduates pointed out, however, that coursebooks
aimed at those students must include some materials on constitutional criminal procedure-an indication of one difference between the disciplines of law-school constitutional law and arts-and-sciences constitutional law.
30. My personal preference would be to eliminate detailed discussion of standing
doctrine, which has become increasingly complex and is usually dealt with in courses on
federal jurisdiction and administrative law. I would use the somewhat simpler political
question doctrine as the vehicle to raise questions about the constitutional limits on judicial power to interpret the Constitution. I do not expect this particular exclusion to happen soon, however.
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Strikingly, the dormant commerce clause was the primary
candidate for exclusion, though it was hardly a unanimous
choice. People agreed that, in the abstract, dormant commerce
clause materials added something to the course.31 It was not
clear that those materials' marginal contribution was large
enough, relative to what else might be inserted into the course.
And yet the dormant commerce clause may be the most important subject dealt with in the constitutional law course for practicing lawyers. To put it bluntly: A practicing lawyer has almost
no need to know the difference between the two- or three-tier
approach to equal protection law and the sliding-scale approach,
but has a pressing need to know the difference between ERISA
preemption and ordinary preemption. Lawyers practicing in
large law firms will rarely confront a serious free expression or
substantive due process question, but they will routinely confront substantial preemption arguments, and dormant commerce
clause doctrine is almost essential to an understanding of preemption doctrine. These lawyers, and lawyers practicing in
other settings, may occasionally come across a serious takings
problem, often in the context of a zoning dispute for a large
commercial client. Even there, however, the constitutional claim
is more likely to be a threat used to intimidate the other side in
negotiations over the conditions under which a building permit
will be granted, than a claim that might actually be vindicated in
litigation. Constitutional law as represented in the canon plays a
trivial role in the real world of legal practice. 32
In short, the question of whether, or how much, to teach
about the dormant commerce clause raises important issues
31. The dormant commerce clause cases illustrate a form of non-textual or penumbral reasoning and so provide a contrast with the commerce clause cases (and a preview
of modem substantive due process cases). They provide a means of introducing some
basic economics into the constitutional law course and sometimes some basic public
choice ideas. And there are enough recent cases with varying facts to make the area a
productive one to teach general analytic skills.
32. Of course constitutional law creates the structure of government, with which
lawyers must deal every day. But constitutional law courses rarely examine anything important that flows from that structure and affects daily legal practice. I suspect that most
senior partners would snicker (or politely move on) if a recent law school graduate suggested that some legislation they were dealing with for a client raised an interesting and
possibly substantial Lopez question (even if, in some sense, it did). Of course the senior
partner would ask the junior associate to look into the problem in more detail, but my
guess is that the senior partner (or the client) would be unhappy if the research used up
more than a handful of billable hours. The importance of Lopez will vary with the practice setting, and it certainly is more important to lawyers working for members of Congress and for clients seeking to influence the drafting or enactment of federal statutes.
But that is a relatively small segment of the legal community.
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about the law school's role in educating professionals and responsible citizens. It is the locus where a real trade-off might actually take place. A survey of constitutional law teachers to see
what they do with the dormant commerce clause would, I think,
be quite revealing about our understanding of our function. 33
To conclude this introduction to the papers that follow: I
have identified a number of themes that run through a large
number of the papers. Perhaps, though, the most interesting
ones will be the idiosyncratic ones-those that stray so far from
the current canon of constitutional law that we would have a
dramatically different canon if their suggestions were adopted,
not merely one that shifted around the margins. I hope that the
collection will provoke readers to think seriously about the syllabi they construct. I know that it had that effect on me.

33. Again, the situation of teachers in law schools is different from that in undergraduate programs. I think it quite difficult to make a substantial case for including material on the dormant commerce clause in an undergraduate course, where, I would
think, the primary concern must be for educating responsible citizens. But I do not teach
undergraduates and may be mistaken.

